



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

John Mc MATTON

Here is a copy
of what I sent
to Gen Vessey
about our IMOC.
Be glad to fill
you in.
Jim

DIRECTOR

DIA review completed.

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Executive Registry

84 - 9964

21 November 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Senior Military Intelligence Officers' Conference (SMIOC)

1. [] From 14-16 November 1984, DIA hosted a Senior Military Intelligence Officers' Conference (SMIOC) at HQ, SAC. This was the first SMIOC ever held at a Unified or Specified Command and it proved to be both exciting and informative. Briefings and tours included collection and production of intelligence to include visits to COBRA BALL, RIVET JOINT, LOOKING GLASS, AND THE NEACP aircraft as well as production and ADP facilities where 1700 people work for SAC intelligence.

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2. [] The SMIOC originated in 1977 and originally considered substantive intelligence topics of interest to DoD and over which controversy had arisen. Since 1981 I have tried to focus attention on community planning, management, personnel, programs and budgets. This now includes both the GDIP and TIARA. An agenda is attached.

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3. [] At the opening each J-2 or ACSI representative provided initial comments or points of concern which are highlighted for you.

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JSTPS

Movable targets are already causing problems because of our collection gaps.

ADCOM

General Herres' #1 priority is how to integrate I&W with tactical warning. The cruise missile threat is crucial also. ADCOM is also excited by your initiative on US responses to Soviet activities.

USFJ

Development of an intelligence architecture is the biggest item. The command needs people, ADP and standardized procedures.

PACOM

Development of a theater intelligence architecture is #1 priority. Critical projects include the Pre H Hour Attack Scenario, an Amphibious/Ground Force Utilization Study, the Red Campaign Plan and a Sea Lines of Communication Study with Japan.

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MAC

Architectures - MAC is in the middle of what everyone is doing.

LANTCOM

Biggest concern is our ability to locate and characterize the activity of the Soviet SSBN force and the SLCM carriers of the future. Also worried about inability to digest the expected flow of data from new satellite collectors-SIGINT and IMINT.

REDCOM

Architecture here is a peculiar problem because mission involves land defense of CONUS and support to civil defense. Need a lot of DIA help.

SOUTHCOM

Tactical intelligence is the game in CENTAM. Must not lose sight of potential for problems along the Andean Ridge. Architecture effort begins in January 1985.

EUCOM

Architectural effort well underway but must focus on coalition war. Need to include adequate communications. The initial programmatic initiatives are in the FY 86 budget from the TIAP program.

USN

Delighted that we will examine recruiting/retention of civilian workforce. NAVINTCOM can't compete.

USAF

Manpower restrictions will limit ability to do new things. Reduction of Army funding for joint tactical fusion a big problem. Reconnaissance aircraft follow on of high interest.

SHAPE

Work beginning on intelligence architecture. DIA support is amazing compared to years ago.

ARMY

Support for SW Asia scenario difficult. Corps and division intelligence structure and support doctrine. More divisions without more people will really strain the CEWI concept which has never settled down.

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Their first intelligence plan, which focuses on exploiting the coming generation of new collection systems, is in the mail. Believe they are ready to cope with new systems. Impact on delegated production worrisome but as yet unknown. By summer 1985 investment for intelligence will be \$500 million at SAC.

4. [] During the conference it was apparent that communications to support intelligence is the major day-to-day problem. Every exercise demonstrates our inability to pass along what we know. Conferees concurred that efforts now underway by DCA, DIA, C3S and NSA must be well coordinated and are crucial but that there may not be sufficient leverage to move study results to implementation.

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5. [] Development of theater architectures must proceed so that J-2's can control what each echelon collects, processes and disseminates. Conferees support work underway at DIA to produce an integrated data base for use at all levels from national down to division and believe it will also be useful in surviving our forces and intelligence capability. Unfavorable budget actions on the Joint Tactical Fusion Project increases the importance of DIA efforts to use the DODIIS network to move this data base.

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6. [] Focus of communications, intelligence data base development, architectures for intelligence and planning must be on warfighting. Your emphasis on intelligence has not gone unnoticed and your concern for crisis operations was discussed at length. The conferees were pleased to learn that C3S, DIA and NSA have agreed to form a cell in C3S to coordinate our approaches to resolving the communications problems addressed at the conference. NSA has formed an office to deal with support to tactical forces and all of DIA is becoming more attuned to the J-2 role. DIA coordinates its activities in the Vice Directorate for Management and Operations.

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7. [] We also discussed at length what should result from almost a dozen studies now underway on architectures, communications, production, data base realignment, collection management, and training. All of this, coupled with evolving DIA involvement in the DRB process, our oversight role for intelligence training (GDIP and TIARA), the HUMINT plan, and my control of intelligence agreements has lead the Military Intelligence Board (MIG) to investigate whether a formal Defense Intelligence System should evolve. The MIB is concerned, as were SMIOC participants, that we leave our replacements an orderly road map for the next five years. DIA will formulate a strawman by January and the next SMIOC in April will attempt to agree on a product.

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8. [] Concern was expressed for the rapidly []

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[] Technological advancements abroad will very soon expose the US to more Soviet high resolution overhead reconnaissance and protective measures have not been seriously addressed. Availability of US produced imagery of CONUS to the general public is about to begin and, indeed, is already here for high resolution airborne photography. DIA and the services are working this with OSD, SAC and the Services.

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9. ☐ Replacement of the U-2R fleet received considerable attention and I took advantage of our presence at SAC to coordinate with the V/CINC on the subject (He was once the U-2 PM). PACOM agreed to submit more justification for its existing ROC and EUCOM stressed the need for additional airframes. The group does not believe the distinction from the U-2 and TR-1 is significant and believes Air Force and the intelligence community must state the need more clearly. DIA and SAC will work this with the DCI.

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10. ☐ A good deal of discussion was devoted to ways in which DIA can assist the commands and services to take advantage of recently approved civilian personnel legislation. Severe grade structure imbalances, inability to hire or retain and a lack of CONUS rotation are long standing problems. DIA has agreed to assume responsibility for billets in Korea and in FY 85 obtained counterintelligence billets for Europe where none had existed. Since most J-2 staffs lack any civilian expertise there was support for an attempt at developing a rotating billet structure that would provide expertise and continuity while broadening the regional expertise of DIA civilian analysts and providing some language training as well. Care must be exercised in doing this because service intelligence grade imbalances are severe and we could build a "brain drain" problem. Service ACSI representatives, J-2's and DIA will attempt to draft a proposal.


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11. ☐ The future of the DoD Foreign Counterintelligence Program (FCIP) was addressed in open session. With the initiation of the current study of DUSD(P) and C3I uncertainties have been expressed as to how the FCIP is to be managed. It currently has a narrow, programmatic focus and little room for new initiatives in analysis or communications and support. Service conferees were generally unaware of the problem but agreed to a fast review aimed at recommending to you and SecDef what might be done. Some discussion ensued over DIA's possible role since the IG(CM) Director sits on both the IG(CI) and the SIG(I) as the JCS representative, and because DIA already has a FCIP role for OSD and JCS. As a consequence of this conferees could foresee DIA assuming for the FCIP.

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12. ☐ This summary barely touches what transpired at the SMIOC. Each one is a valuable forum and leads to many private discussions and problem solving sessions. I am available at your convenience for further discussions.

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JAMES A. WILLIAMS
Lieutenant General, US Army
Director

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